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THE ROLE OF THE SENATE IN THE KENYAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 
by J . H. Proctor, Jr. 
K ENYA is one of the very few new African states which have instituted bicameral legislatures, and the survival of a second chamber in that country has been a matter of considerable uncertainty until quite 
recently. 
Only a little more than a month after the first meeting of the Kenya 
Senate on June 7, 1963, one of the Opposition members voiced the suspicion 
that some Ministers had "a negative attitude towards this House" and 
reported that a rumour was already circulating "that the Senate may be 
washed out."1 The Leader of Government Business sought to reassure the 
body in September. "So far," he asserted, "it is not the intention of either 
the Government or the party in power that the Senate should not continue."2 
Those words did not set the matter at rest, however; reference was made in 
December by another Senator to "grumbling in the last three months that 
the Senate would probably be dissolved."3 On March 25, 1964, the Leader 
of Government Business acknowledged that there had been widespread 
speculation as to whether the Senate should be "scrapped," but emphasized 
that a unicameral system could be established only by formally amending 
the Constitution.4 
Following the announcement in August that the Government would soon 
submit for approval a comprehensive set of constitutional amendments 
designed to transform Kenya into a Republic and to concentrate more power 
at the center, Mr. K. N. Gichoya rose in the House of Representatives to urge 
those who were drafting them "to examine the position of the Senate to 
see whether it is necessary or desirable or is just an institution for consuming 
the public money."5 Anxiety about the future of the upper house mounted 
during September, for on the 4th of that month it was adjourned for an 
indefinite period because the palantypists who recorded its debates had 
resigned and no replacements could be found. Members of the Opposition 
thereupon accused the Government of seeking to undermine bicameralism 
1 Kenya Senate, Official Report, July 9, 1963, col. 292 (Sen. W. Wamalwa). 
2 Ibid., September 24, 1963, col. 900 (Sen. J. P. Mathenge). 
3 Ibid., December 31, 1963, col. 35 (Sen. J. K. Kebaso). 
1 Ibid., cols. 518-520 (Sen. J . P. Mathenge). 
5 Kenya House of Representatives, Official Report, August 14, 1964, col. 1747. 
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without bothering to amend the Constitution, and the editor of the Nairobi 
Daily Nation wrote that the Senate's "enforced vacation" was giving it 
"just the kind of publicity which is one of these days going to cost it its 
life." The people might well conclude, he predicted, that the second chamber 
was "actually superfluous" since "no national calamity has resulted from 
the Senate standstill," and the Government's supporters would now be more 
inclined to favor drastic changes in the Constitution.6 
The Senate was able to resume its work on September 29, however, follow-
ing the installation of tape-recording equipment, and on October 8 the 
Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs appeared before a special, 
off-the-record meeting of the Senators to inform them authoritatively that 
no alteration of the structure or the powers of the upper house would be 
included in the forthcoming amendment proposals—an assurance which was 
confirmed when the text of the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill 
was published later that month. 
Now that this institution has survived what many regarded as an experi-
mental if not probationary period, an analysis and evaluation of its record 
seems appropriate. What purposes was the Senate intended to serve, and 
to what extent had these been realized by October 8, 1964? What interests 
was it supposed to represent, and had these in fact found effective expres-
sion ? What powers was it assigned, and what use had it made of them in 
practice? What functions had it actually performed? In the answers to 
these questions may be found an explanation for the uncertainty surrounding 
the Senate as well as for the decision to retain it. 
I 
The idea of a second chamber for Kenya was originally proposed by the 
Kenya African Democratic Union (hereafter called KADU) as part of its 
plan to provide protection for the smaller tribes, which that party repre-
sented, against the danger of domination by the larger and more advanced 
Kikuyu and Luo groups, which supported the Kenya African National Union 
(hereafter called KANU). KADU desired a federal system in which consider-
able power would be allocated to regional governments. An upper house 
was considered necessary to safeguard the autonomy of the regions and to 
assure sufficient representation of minority interests at the center, for it 
was recognized that a unicameral legislature elected on the basis of "one-
man, one-vote" might very well be completely controlled by KANU which 
favored a greater centralization of power. Mr. Ronald Ngala, leader of 
KADU, said upon his arrival in London for the 1962 constitutional con-
ference, "We believe that a two-Chamber Parliament with a Senate especially 
charged with preserving the rights of the regions is the only way to ensure 
the continuing liberty of the individual."7 
6 Daily Nation, September 23, 1964. 
7 East African Standard, February 12, 1962. 
3 9 0 
t ROLE OF SENATE IN KENYAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Bicameralism was also supported by Asian merchants and European 
settlers in Kenya as a means of providing some checJ against hasty, ill-
advised, or discriminatory action. 
KADU submitted to the 1962 conference a detailed set of proposals which 
included provision for a powerful Senate to be elected indirectly and on a 
regional basis. It would consist of five members for each region, chosen by 
the regional assembly and serving for a fixed term of four years. Its legis-
lative power would be equal to that of the lower chamber; conflicts between 
the two would be resolved by a joint committee. The cabinet would be 
responsible to the entire National Assembly; its members would be elected 
by both houses sitting together. A 75 per cent affirmative vote in each house 
would be necessary for constitutional amendments, and a two-thirds majority 
would be required for the declaration of an emergency. 
KANU went to London firmly committed to a unicameral parliament 
elected on the basis of universal suffrage. A second chamber would be too 
expensive and would make effective government too difficult, they held. 
The KADU proposal was condemned by KANU's leader, Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, 
as "the thin edge of the wedge which regionalists would exploit."8 KADU 
was so adamant, however, that KANU conceded the principle of bi-
cameralism after a few days, but insisted that the Senate must not be em-
powered to block bills passed by the lower house and that it must be com-
posed of one representative elected from each of the existing administrative 
districts. 
KADU was very reluctant to accept such fundamental changes in its 
concept of what the upper house should be, but agreement was finally 
reached 011 a compromise solution which was based on a series of memoranda 
prepared by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Reginald Maudling. 
He defined the purposes of a second chamber to be "partly to ensure proper 
representation of geographical views and interests, partly to act as a revising 
and reforming house, and also, possibly most important, to act as funda-
mental protector of individual rights and liberties."9 The essential point 
regarding its composition, he submitted, was to assure "particular influence 
to local or special interests."10 Election by districts would, he believed, 
"provide a much more effective safeguard for minorities and individuals" 
than regional elections which would only produce an unworkable house.11 
It was agreed, accordingly, that each of the forty districts plus the Nairobi 
area should elect one Senator, with qualifications for voters and candidates 
being the same as for local government elections. Moreover, consideration 
would be given in subsequent negotiations at Nairobi, which would be 
8 Ibid., February 26, 1962. 
9 Ibid., March 22, 1962. 
'"Ibid., March 13, 1962. 
11 Ibid., March 22, 1962. 
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necessary to fill in the details of the constitutional framework, to including 
"non-voting members representing special interests."111 
Mr. Maudling maintained that the Senate's powers must not be such as to 
"involve the possibility of bringing the government of the country to a 
standstill," but that they must be sufficient to prevent the majority from 
infringing the rights of individuals and minorities as defined in the Con-
stitution.13 He therefore proposed that the Senate's legislative authority 
should be as limited as that of the House of Lords, but that its approval by 
a very large majority should be required for the use of emergency powers 
and for any changes in the Constitution which might affect the entrenched 
rights of individuals, regions, tribal authorities, or districts. These principles 
were accepted, and it was stipulated in the report of the London conference 
that a majority of 75 per cent of each house would be necessary for any 
constitutional amendments except those affecting the entrenched rights for 
which a 90 per cent majority in the Senate would be required, and that 
"substantially more than 50 per cent" of each house would have to approve 
the declaration of a state of emergency.11 Sixty-five per cent was subsequently 
agreed to. 
KADU had thus won a second chamber for Kenya which was considerably 
weaker than it had wished for, but which had at least been given sufficient 
power to enable it to safeguard the Constitution. Whether it would function 
as a bulwark for regionalism seemed highly questionable, however, since 
the regions themselves would not be represented therein. 
The only problems relating to the Senate which provoked open controversy 
as the final draft of the Constitution took shape in Nairobi were concerned 
with how its members were to be chosen. Strong objections were raised in 
the Kenya Legislative Council when the terms of the franchise were 
announced. These specified that to vote in Senate elections, one must either 
(1) be listed as the rateable owner or occupier of property by the local 
government authority for the place of registration and have paid all rates 
due on such property, or (2) have paid for each of the past three years a 
rate or tax levied for general purposes by that authority, or (3) have ordi-
narily resided in the local government area wherein he registered for at 
least five out of the preceding seven years, or (4) be married to a person 
falling in one of the previous categories. Such qualifications contrasted 
sharply with those required of voters for the House of Representatives, 
which were simply that one must have ordinarily resided in Kenya for at 
least a year preceding registration and in the constituency for only five 
months of that year. The difference was said to be designed to ensure that 
Senators would be elected by persons who were really identified with the 
" U n i t e d Kingdom Parliamentary Papers, 1962, Cmd. 1700, Report ol the Kenya 
Constitutional Conference, 1962, Appendix II, p. 16. 
13 East African Standard, March 13, 1962. 
" Cmd. 1700, Appendix II, pp. 18-19. 
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areas in which they voted, and reflected the intention expressed at London 
to have local interests particularly represented in the second chamber. Mr. 
Oginga Odinga, KANU vice-president, condemned these :.pecial requirements 
as "unfair, unjust, discriminatory, contrary to the Bill of Rights and demo-
cratic principles,"15 and charged that their effect would be to deny the vote 
to poorer people and to those who had been removed from their home areas 
to detention camps during the Mau Mau Emergency. Such allegations were 
denied by the Minister for Legal Affairs, Mr. A. M. F. Webb, and the Minister 
for Labor, Mr. T. ]. Mboya, who explained that the phrase "ordinarily 
resident" would be broadly interpreted so that Emergency detainees would 
not be excluded. The legislature thereupon defeated Mr. Odinga's motion 
which asked that the franchise for the Senate be the same as that for the 
lower house. 
None of those who defended the controversial requirements argued that 
their aim was to favor property owners in Senate elections and thereby 
produce a somewhat conservative body which would balance the more 
democratically elected House of Representatives. A further indication that 
no such purpose was intended for the second chamber was the decision to 
drop the "possibility" accepted at London that non-voting members might 
be included to represent special interests—a decision which prompted a 
sharp but futile protest by Sir Frederick Cavendish-Bentinck, the leader of 
the European political group known as the Kenya Coalition. 
Differences of opinion also emerged regarding the shape of Senate con-
stituencies. There was some pressure for the creation of new districts to 
permit a more satisfactory representation for certain tribes, but this was 
initially resisted by KANU on the grounds that it would encourage people 
to think of themselves as tribal groups rather than as one nation. The 
commission which was set up to demarcate the six regions into which the 
country was to be divided recommended boundaries which cut through 
some of the existing districts in order to separate antagonistic tribes and to 
group together others that wished to be so associated.16 The Government 
accepted its report with only minor variations and therefore found it 
necessary to modify certain district borders so that no district would be 
located in more than one region. In the process, three districts were actually 
partitioned out of existence and three new ones created. The effect of these 
changes was to make the Senate constituencies more homogeneous tribally 
and thus provide more nearly—although still not perfectly—for the repre-
sentation of tribes as such in the upper chamber. In thirty-five of the forty-
one constituencies, one tribe constituted an absolute majority of the popula-
tion and in seventeen districts over 90 per cent were of the same tribe. 
15 Kenya Legislative Council, Debates, October 18, 1962, col. 168. 
" U n i t e d Kingdom Parliamentary Papers, 1962, Cmd. 1899, Kenya Report of the 
Regional Boundaries Commission, pp. 1-16. 
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It was clear that representation on the basis of one member for each of 
these constituencies would operate to the advantage of the smaller and less 
advanced tribes, giving them more seats in the Senate than they could expect 
to receive on the basis of numbers alone. The pastoral tribes were generally 
favored over the agricultural tribes, for the districts of the former were 
more sparsely populated. The Samburu District, for example, had a popula-
tion of 56,600 and the Masai District of Kajiado, 68,400; while the Luo 
District of Central Nyanza contained 617,800 and the Abaluhya District 
of Kakamega, 600,200." The districts had been defined in such a way as to 
assure the Kikuyu a number of seats proportionate to their size, but there 
were striking disproportions for other tribes. The Luo, for example, consti-
tuted approximately 13 per cent of the total population of Kenya and the 
Masai 1.7 per cent, but the number of predominantly Masai districts was 
equal to the number of predominantly Luo districts and each of these tribes 
would have 5 per cent of the seats in the Senate. 
Agreement was reached, apparently without difficulty, that Senators 
should be directly elected and that the age requirement for them should be 
the same as for members of the House of Representatives—twenty-one years. 
There was thus no effort by the constitution-makers to assure that the 
second chamber would be a Council of Elders. The qualifications for election 
to the Senate did differ from those for the lower house, however, in that 
candidates for the former were required to be registered as voters in the 
particular constituency they proposed to represent. This was evidently 
designed to increase the likelihood that each Senator would feel a special 
concern for his own district. 
It was also agreed readily that a Senator's term should be fixed for six 
years and that the life of the Senate would not be affected by the dissolution 
of the House of Representatives or the fall of a Government. This provision 
meant, as Mr. Mboya pointed out later, that "changes in the mood of the 
electorate will not be reflected so quickly in the composition of the Senate 
as in the composition of the House of Representatives" and was intended to 
enable Senators to "achieve a degree of detachment from the more violent 
fluctuations of political mood and party politics."18 The chances of fluctua-
tion were further reduced by the provision that the expiration of the 
members' terms would be staggered so that no more than one-third of the 
seats would fall vacant at any one time. 
The legislative powers specified for the Senate were modelled closely on 
those of the House of Lords, as had been decided at London. It was provided 
that money bills must originate in the lower house and could only be 
delayed by the Senate for one month. The reconsideration of other bills 
17 Kenya Population Census, 1962. Tables. Advance Report of Volumes 1 and II 
(Economics and Statistics Division, Ministry of Finance of Economic Planning, 
January 1964), p. 4. 
18 East Africa Standard, November 6, 1964. 
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could be forced; if the Senate failed to pass one or passed it with amend-
ments unacceptable to the House of Representatives, that House could 
override the Senate by simply passing the bill again one year after its 
original action. 
The Senate was given no control over the life of the Government. The 
Constitution specified that the Prime Minister would be chosen from the 
House of Representatives and would hold his position so long as he com-
manded a majority in that House. Only the lower house could pass a motion 
of no confidence. 
No provision appeared in the final draft of the Constitution regarding its 
amendment. This omission was said by the Minister for Legal Affairs to be 
due to the fact that Kenya could not amend the basic instrument so long as 
it remained a dependency. The presumption was that the provisions agreed 
to at the London conference would become effective when independence 
was attained. 
It soon became apparent, however, that those provisions were no longer 
acceptable to KANU. In the campaign preceding the general election of 
May 1963, the candidates of that party pointed out that it would be practi-
cally impossible to secure a 90 per cent majority in the upper house under 
any circumstances and that only five of its members could block a change 
strongly desired by all the other Senators and the entire House of Repre-
sentatives. Mr. Mboya, in particular, urged that the Constitution be made 
more flexible as a means of strengthening constitutionalism itself. A 
constitution with such unworkable amendment provisions would create 
unbearable strains and might have to be broken, he argued. 
KANU failed to win 90 per cent of the seats in the Senate, but did gain 
a majority in both houses, whereupon its leaders claimed that they had 
received a mandate to make the changes in the Constitution which they had 
proposed during the campaign. KADU maintained, however, that the elec-
torate had merely given KANU a mandate to govern under the Constitution, 
and that the Constitution itself could be altered only in accordance with 
the amending procedure which had been agreed to at London. 
The KANU view prevailed, for the question was finally settled through 
further negotiations with the British. At a conference which opened in 
London on September 25, 1963, the new Government demanded that 
ordinary amendments should be made by 65 per cent of the two houses 
sitting together, that the entrenched clauses should be amended by a 65 
per cent majority in each of the two houses separately, and that a proposed 
amendment which Parliament rejected could be passed by a 65 per cent 
affirmative vote in a national referendum. The Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Mr. Duncan Sandys, considered it necessary to go at least part 
way to meet these demands lest the entire Constitution be destroyed. He 
agreed, therefore, that the sections defining the powers of the regional 
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assemblies should be removed from the entrenched category, and that all 
sections which were not entrenched could be amended by a two-thirds 
majority in a referendum plus a simple majority of both houses in case a 
75 per cent affirmative vote could not be mobilized in the two chambers 
initially. The clauses which remained entrenched and therefore could still 
not be changed without a 90 per cent majority in the Senate were those 
affecting the rights of the individual; the judiciary; the boundaries of the 
regions; the structure, composition, franchise, and procedure of the regional 
assemblies; tribal land rights; the Senate; the boundaries of the districts; and 
the amendment procedure." Thus the Senate retained the power to prevent 
assaults on constitutionally defined minority rights, but its capacity to 
defend the substance of the regional system itself was severely reduced. 
II 
The elections gave KANU a much smaller margin in the Senate than in 
the House of Representatives. Approximately two-thirds of the seats in the 
lower chamber were won by that party; while in the Senate contests sixteen 
KADU candidates were victorious, two members of the African Peoples' 
Party (hereafter called APP) triumphed over their KANU opponents, and 
only eighteen seats were won by KANU. KANU also received, however, 
the support of one Senator belonging to the Northern Province United 
Association, with which it had been allied during the campaign, and of one 
Independent who joined KANU as soon as the electoral results were 
announced, so that it had a majority from the start of 20 to 18. Moreover, 
one KADU member crossed the floor on the first day the Senate met and 
the two APP members followed him three months later. This gave the 
Government side a majority of 60.5 per cent (since three seats remained 
unfilled due to the boycott of the elections by the districts of the North-
Eastern Region in protest against Britain's refusal to cede that area to the 
Somali Republic), which meant that KADU still had enough strength to 
prevent the declaration of an emergency, to force a referendum on any 
proposal to amend the ordinary provisions of the Constitution, and to block 
absolutely any effort to alter the entrenched clauses. This situation con-
tinued until February 28, 1964, when three members from the North-Eastern 
Region took their seats on the Government back-benches and another KADU 
Senator crossed the floor. The Government now enjoyed a 65.8 per cent 
majority—sufficient for the proclamation of an emergency but still short 
of the amount required for constitutional amendment. The Opposition 
suffered only one more defection during the period under examination, 
and that was not enough to give the Government control of the amending 
process. 
As had been expected, the basis of representation in the Senate operated 
" U n i t e d Kingdom Parliamentary Papers, 1963, Cmd. 2156, Kenya Independence 
Conference, 1963, pp. 7-8, 21-22. 
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in favor of KADU and the smaller tribes which supported it—so much so 
that the June 14th issue of the militantly pro-KANU magazine Van-Africa 
termed the outcome of the election altogether unfair and undemocratic. 
In the twenty-eight contested constituencies, KANU polled a total of 
1,028,906 votes and won thirteen seats, while KADU polled 474,933 votes 
and won twelve seats. The population of the five districts in which KANU 
candidates were unopposed was 880,000 while the population of the four 
districts which returned KADU candidates without contest was 351,800. 
Thus it could be said that on the average each KANU Senator had received 
the support of approximately twice as many voters as had each KADU 
Senator. 
The composition of the new Senate was not such, however, as to provide 
any representation for the European and Asian minorities or for the proper-
tied interests. All of its seats were filled by black Africans and none by men 
of wealth. Approximately half of its members were former school teachers 
and most of the others had earned their living in minor government posts. 
Only five described themselves as businessmen, and their businesses were 
quite small. 
Whether the Senators would bring the benefits of greater maturity, wider 
experience, and broader vision to bear as they reviewed the work of the 
lower house seemed doubtful, for it was clear that the more able politicians 
had sought seats in the other chamber. The average age of the Senators was 
thirty-seven—hardly high enough to classify them as elders. Only three had 
received a university-level education; two of these graduated in Veterinary 
Science from Makerere College in Uganda and one attended that institution 
for three years but failed to complete the degree requirements. Only seven 
of them had travelled outside East Africa. Only two had served in the Legis-
lative Council and neither of them for more than two years. Also question-
able was whether the Senators would be any less partisan in their delibera-
tions than the members of the House of Representatives. Approximately 
half of them had been very actively involved in politics, serving as chair-
man, secretary, or treasurer of local party branches. 
Ill 
Members on both sides of the aisle repeatedly affirmed that the Senate 
should play a vigorous part in the legislative process. Senators must carefully 
scrutinize every bill, they said, and should not hesitate to amend or reject 
those which had been passed by the House of Representatives without 
adequate consideration. 
The Senate's legislative powers were asserted in practice to a very modest 
extent, however. Although the Constitution clearly permitted Senators to 
originate non-money bills, no such initiative was actually exercised. Every 
bill considered by the Senate was introduced by one of the members of the 
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Government Front Bench after having been passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives. 
Nor did the checking and revising function of the second chamber prove 
to be particularly significant. 
Only one bill out of the sixty-two on which the Senate completed action 
during the period under examination was completely rejected by that body, 
and it was quickly repassed by the lower house. This was a measure which 
provided increased pensions for retired civil servants. It was opposed by 
Senators of both parties on the ground that the new Government could not 
afford such a heavy financial burden and should not be expected to shoulder 
it since the pensioners were mainly expatriates who had been employed by 
the colonial regime. A motion to return it to the lower house for reconsidera-
tion was carried without division on August 7, 1963, over the objections of 
the Leader of Government Business. 
It was not necessary for the House of Representatives to take further 
action on this measure since it was a money bill and would therefore be 
presented to the Governor for his assent a month after being sent to the 
Senate even if that body failed to pass it—"unless," according to Sec. 51 (1) 
of the Constitution, "the House of Representatives otherwise resolves."20 
The Speaker of the lower house delayed presenting this bill for more than 
one month, however, because the Representatives had adjourned on August 2 
and did not reconvene until September 10, and he felt that they should be 
given an opportunity to resolve that it should not now go forward. Such a 
resolution was moved by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Ngala, who 
emphasized that the Senators were "elected representatives . . . not just a 
House of Lords type of people" and argued that their decision therefore 
"shows that the whole country, the public, is completely against the Bill."21 
The Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Mr. Mboya, stated that 
the Government respected the Senate, but could not accept Mr. Ngala's 
motion because the bill had already been fully debated, no new arguments 
had been produced in the upper chamber, and nothing had happened since 
the House's original action to justify a reversal of its position. The motion 
was thereupon negatived without division. 
Ironically, in this case the Senators were less resistant to the mood of the 
electorate than were the members of the House of Representatives. They 
might even have been accused, with some justification, of toadying to the 
masses in refusing to approve an unpopular but necessary bill and thereby 
forcing the lower house to assume full responsibility for its enactment. No 
such charge was actually made, however. In fact, only one member of the 
House of Representatives expressed any irritation over what the Senate had 
done; a KANU back-bencher, Mr. Waira Kamau, said simply: 
20 Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 30, 18 April 1963, p. 48. 
21 Kenya House of Representatives, Officio/ Report, September 12. 1963, cols. 1855-
1856. 
3 9 8 
t ROLE OF SENATE IN KENYAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 
. . . if we continue to repeat such Motions or Bills whenever they are 
passed, it is going to cause confusion between the Government and the 
public outside. So I would say to the House that whenever it passes a Bill, 
it should be final and other people should not play about with it.22 
The Senate succeeded in securing amendments to only three bills and all 
of these changes were quite minor. The Pyrethrum Bill as passed by the 
lower house required licensed growers of pyrethrum to pay a cess to the 
Marketing Board, which would issue to them in return one unit of loan 
stock for each 100 shillings paid in. Any amount less than 100 shillings 
would be credited to the next unit of stock, provided that if one ceased to be 
a licensed grower he would forfeit his interest in that amount. Sen. N. W. 
Munoko, the Leader of the Opposition, moved that the proviso be deleted, 
arguing that it would be unjust to require the forfeiture of any amount and 
that the poorer growers would be the ones who would suffer most. This 
amendment was accepted by the Leader of Government Business and 
approved by the Committee of the Whole Senate on March 10, 1964; but 
after consulting with the Minister for Agriculture, he moved that the bill 
be recommitted and thereupon proposed that the words "100 shillings" be 
changed to "twenty shillings" throughout the bill and that the forfeiture 
proviso remain.23 Sen. Munoko accepted this modification and the bill, so 
amended, was finally passed by the Senate. When the House of Representa-
tives re-assembled on June 9, the Minister for Agriculture announced that 
the Government was quite prepared to accept the Senate amendment, 
offering no other explanation than that 100 shillings was too high a figure 
for some of the small farmers. The amendment was thereupon carried 
without debate. 
The second bill to be successfully amended by the Senate was the Central 
Road Authority Bill. Sen. G. G. Kago (KANU) proposed that an appointee 
of the Minister for Commerce and Industry be added to the membership of 
the Authority since that Minister had a strong interest in the determination 
of which roads should be constructed and improved. The amendment was 
accepted by the Leader of Government Business and approved by the Senate 
without debate on September 1, 1964. Its adoption by the House of Repre-
sentatives was moved on October 14 by the Minister for Works, Communica-
tions and Power, who said that he saw no particular reason for including 
such an additional member but that it really made no difference to him. 
The Minister for Agriculture and the Minister for Commerce and Industry 
also spoke in support of the amendment. It was opposed by a few KADU 
members, one of whom strongly implied that the Minister for Commerce 
and Industry had himself surreptitiously suggested such a change to the 
Senate. This allegation was denied by the Minister and withdrawn in com-
22 Ibid., cok. 1862-1863. 
23 Kenya Senate, Official Report, March 17, 1964, col. 327. 
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pliance with the Deputy Speaker's ruling when it could not be substantiated. 
Finally, two amendments were made in the Export Duty Bill on September 
30, 1964. "Nyasaland" was changed to "Malawi" in the list of countries to 
which coffee might be shipped without the payment of export duties and 
the "Republic of South Africa" was dropped from the list. The Leader of 
Government Business warmly endorsed these alterations, which had been 
proposed by Sen. Kago (KANU), and they were approved without objection. 
The House of Representatives quickly agreed to the amendments after the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury termed them "purely procedural" 
and said the Senate had merely caught two "small errors" which the House 
had inadvertently made.24 
The only amendment passed by the Senate but rejected by the House was 
one which the Government was apparently prepared to accept originally. 
It provided that the consent of the entire National Assembly rather than of 
the House of Representatives alone should be required for the Cereals and 
Sugar Finance Corporation to incur an indebtedness exceeding £5 million. 
This amendment was introduced by the Leader of the Opposition, passed 
unanimously by the Senate on October 7, 1964, and presented to the House 
of Representatives by the Minister for Finance and Economic Planning 
without objection since, he said, "it amounts to the same thing."26 The 
Speaker offered his opinion at this point, however, that such a change would 
in fact constitute an encroachment on the lower house's special responsibility 
for financial matters, whereupon the Minister conferred with his colleagues 
on the Front Bench and then announced that the Government opposed the 
amendment. It was thereupon defeated. 
Additional amendments to the Central Road Authority Bill and to 
eighteen other measures were suggested by various Senators, but were not 
pressed to a vote except in six cases and then without success. 
A mere tabulation of bills defeated or modified as a result of Senate action 
does not, of course, provide a sufficient indication of that body's role in 
law-making. It is possible that there was so little open conflict between the 
two houses because the wishes of Senators had been taken into account 
before the bills were introduced in the lower house, although there is no 
evidence of any systematic effort to discover their views in advance. It is 
true that the Leader of Government Business in the Senate received Cabinet 
papers and consulted frequently with individual Ministries, but he did not 
attend Cabinet meetings except on very rare occasions at the special invita-
tion of the Prime Minister and his opinion on contemplated legislation was 
not sought as a regular procedure. Moreover, the KANU members of the 
two houses met in separate caucuses until only six weeks or so before the 
end of the period under examination. 
24 Kenya House of Representatives, Official Report, October 7, 1964, col. 3208. 
M Ibid., November 4, 1964, col. 4264. 
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It might also be argued that the will of the House of Representatives was 
challenged so seldom because it had done such an excellent job that the 
Senate simply felt there was no need for any revision. This argument was in 
fact put forward by four Senators who issued a public statement on 
September 23, 1964 in reply to criticism of the second chamber's per-
formance. 
Such a defense would be more persuasive if it could be demonstrated 
that the Senate actually considered the measures referred to it in a careful, 
thoughtful, and non-partisan manner. 
As a matter of fact, the Senate's examination of bills were generally quite 
brief and often rather perfunctory. The average time between the first 
reading and final action was only six days. Five bills were disposed of in one 
day, fourteen in two days, one in three, and seventeen in four. Only seven 
bills were before that body for more than a fortnight and five of those were 
delayed because of a recess. Moreover, twenty-four bills—almost 40 per 
cent of those considered—were passed without discussion at any stage 
beyond the short explanatory statement by the Government member intro-
ducing them. 
Speediest action was taken on the Immigration and Deportation (Mis-
cellaneous Amendments) Bill. It was sent to members on the evening of 
February 27, 1964, and passed through all stages in both houses before lunch 
the following day. The Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs told 
the Senators that it was "not the policy of the Government to encroach upon 
the right of the Senate by trying to reduce the period within which they may 
read and consider Bills," but that immediate passage was necessary in this 
case "because of extreme urgency." Details could not be disclosed, he added, 
"due to security reasons."16 The bill was thereupon approved without debate. 
The Senate agreed to exempt twenty-three bills from Standing Order No. 88 
which provided that not more than one stage in their consideration could 
be taken at a single sitting. In some cases the bills were termed urgent while 
in others the exemption was said to be sought simply to give the Senate 
enough work to keep it occupied that day. 
There were strong objections from several Senators of both parties to this 
practice. The Government was rushing things so much, they charged, that 
there was not sufficient time to think about the bills, to consult constituents, 
or to debate them in a statesmanlike fashion. The Senate seemed to be 
regarded, some complained, as a mere rubber stamp. It is clear that Senators 
were several times called upon to act quickly on measures of which they 
had only the vaguest understanding. The Deputy Chief Whip on the Govern-
ment side himself expressed concern over the pressure to which the Senate 
was subjected. "This is becoming rather ridiculous," he said. "At times we 
are blind to what we are passing."27 
26 Kenya Senate, Official Report, February 28, 1964, col. 94. 
27 Ibid., March 4, 1964, col. 105 (Sen. J. M. Koinange). 
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A particularly unfortunate effect of this practice was that it reduced the 
opportunity to move amendments. When Sen. Munoko (KADU) attempted 
to amend the Native Vessels (Amendment) Bill at the Committee Stage after 
having notified the Clerk of his intention to do so just before the Senate went 
into committee, his motion was disallowed by the Chairman because he had 
not complied with the Standing Order which required that notification of 
an amendment must be given before the beginning of the sitting at which 
the bill was considered in committee. Sen. Munoko pointed out that they 
had gone into committee immediately after the Second Reading at the same 
sitting, and protested that this would "set a precedent that the Government 
can come at any time and have the Second Reading and Committee Stage 
on the same day, and in that way they will avoid having any amendments."28 
His point was that the need for an amendment was not apt to become 
apparent until the Second Reading, and then it would be too late. 
The treatment of money bills was especially ineffectual. The Committee 
Stage was omitted altogether for six of them without objection since, as the 
Leader of Government Business pointed out, the Senate was powerless to 
alter such measures. Several Senators, indeed, questioned the usefulness of 
their considering money bills at all. Sen. J. K. Kebaso (KANU) at one point 
asked the Speaker, "Is it not wasting the time of the public to take all this 
afternoon for the graduated personal tax Bill when the Senators know that 
they cannot interfere with money Bills?"28 When criticism of the Supple-
mentary Appropriation Bill became rather spirited, the Speaker felt impelled 
to read out that part of the Constitution which stipulated that the Senate 
could not amend money bills and then said that there had been too much 
talk about making changes in the various items. This prompted the Deputy 
Chief Whip for the Government to ask, "Why are these money Bills brought 
to this Senate. . . ? What are we here for?"30 to which the Speaker could 
only reply that the situation could not be changed without a constitutional 
amendment. 
Senators on both sides of the aisle indicated their dissatisfaction with 
several bills in the course of the debates, but party affiliation was almost 
always determinative when the time came to vote. A thorough analysis of 
their voting behavior is not possible since a division took place on only 
three bills. One of these was the unanimously approved Compensation and 
Retiring Benefits (Amendment) Bill, which required a division because it 
involved a redefinition of certain rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
Another was the Essential Services Bill on which the voting followed party 
lines exactly with the single exception of Sen. C. K. Lubembe (KANU). The 
third was the Agriculture (Amendment) Bill which was opposed by all the 
KADU members and supported by everyone on the Government side except 
28 Ibid., December 4, 1963, col. 1279. 
25 Ibid., col. 1227. 
30 Ibid., March 4, 1964, col. 138 (Sen. J. M. Koinange). 
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the two APP Senators who had crossed the floor three days previously. The 
KANU majority was sufficiently cohesive in the viva voce voting on the 
other bills to enable the Leader of Government Business to have his way in 
all cases but one—the rejection of the Pensions (Increase) (Amendment) Bill. 
The Agriculture (Amendment) Bill, the Trade Disputes Bill, the Asian Offi-
cers' Family Pensions (Amendment) Bill, and the Essential Services Bill were 
each openly criticized by a sufficiently large number of KANU members to 
defeat them had those Senators pressed their opposition to the point of 
voting negatively. 
It is clear that pressure was brought to bear on the dissidents by the party 
leadership before the voting took place on these measures. In his reply on 
the Asian Officers' Family Pension (Amendment) Bill, the Leader of Govern-
ment Business invoked party loyalty in the following terms: 
It is the intention of Government—let me make it clear, particularly to 
Members on this side of the House—that this Bill should be passed and 
become law as quickly as possible. . . . I am asking hon. Senators, particu-
larly on this side, to support the Second Reading of this Bill, otherwise 
I do not know what the consequences will be.31 
When the Agriculture (Amendment) Bill was under consideration, Sen. J. K. 
Lenayiarra (KADU) expressed his pleasure at seeing members from the other 
side stand up to speak against it. "This clearly shows," he said, "that the 
Members of the Senate are mature and are above party politics."32 But his 
colleague, Sen. W. K. Rotich noticed that some of the KANU members 
seemed to have charged their minds overnight. "Yesterday they were with 
us," he said, "they saw the thing as we saw it, and I understand that they 
have been instructed by the Minister who produced the Motion to support 
it."33 The Leader of Government Business accused the Opposition of seeking 
to exploit the bill for partisan purposes and appealed explicitly to those 
behind him to vote affirmatively. When a KADU Senator raised a point of 
order on whether the Leader of Government Business could "force the 
Members on the other side to support the Bill," the Deputy Speaker ruled, 
"What is the use of appointing a Leader of Government Business if he 
cannot advise the Government Back-benchers?"31 Some restiveness with 
party discipline was revealed in the debate on the Trade Disputes Bill. 
Sen. Kago, for example, protested, "We should not be told that we must pass 
this Bill or the other."35 But although he and five other KANU Senators urged 
that it be amended, it too passed without change. 
31 Ibid., August 7, 1963, col. 764 (Sen. J. P. Mathenge). 
32 Ibid., September 20, 1963, col. 876. 
33 Ibid., col. 877. 
34 Ibid., col. 884. 
35 Ibid., March 25, 1964, col. 489. 
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IV 
An evaluation of the Kenya Senate must also take into account its efforts 
to criticize and advise the Government. 
The Senators exercised much more initiative in this respect as they 
proceeded to introduce and debate motions and to ask parliamentary ques-
tions. Forty-eight motions were voted upon during the period under 
examination (not counting those dealing with the declaration of an emer-
gency, which are treated separately below, nor those concerning Senate 
procedure), only seven of which were first considered by the House of 
Representatives and then introduced by the Leader of Government Business 
or at his direction. These seven either commended the Government or 
endorsed something for which it desired support. All of the others urged the 
Government to do something which it was not then doing.36 Moreover, the 
Government was asked a total of 202 questions, followed by numerous 
supplementaries, none of which was obviously "planted". 
The Senate did not use these weapons in such a way as to protect or 
promote the interests of the regions, however. KADU sought to do so at the 
start, but its efforts were resisted by KANU members who argued that it 
was altogether improper for Senators to act as regional representatives. The 
first motion introduced by a KADU member affirmed that the development 
of the Western Region was being hampered by the lack of electric power 
and called upon the Government to supply electricity to the two townships 
there. Sen. J. P. Mathenge (KANU) maintained that this motion was based 
on a "misconception." He said: 
The Mover of this Motion has placed himself as a Member for the Western 
Region, not for his particular constituency. If he had moved some Motion 
referring just to his constituency, well and good, but it looks as if he is 
moving this Motion as a representative of the Western Region.37 
Sen. Mathenge became the Leader of Government Business a fortnight later, 
and the principle which he had enunciated was generally observed thereafter. 
There were indeed only two more motions which reflected concern for a 
particular region. The first of these was moved by Sen. A. R. Tsalwa (KADU) 
on November 21, 1963; it called for the extension of the railway from Butere 
to Bungoma so that it would pass through Kakamega. That route should be 
followed, said Sen. Tsalwa, because Kakamega was the headquarters of the 
Western Region. This motion was amended at Sen. Mathenge's suggestion 
so as to delete any reference to Kakamega. The second one asked the Govern-
ment to encourage the construction of a textile factory in Nyanza Region. 
It was introduced by a KANU Senator who emphasized that the purpose of 
such a factory would be to benefit the entire country, and was passed without 
36 There were also six motions on the adjournment which provided further occasions 
for criticism of Government policy. None of them was pressed to a vote, however, and 
they are not included in the following analysis. 
37 Kenya Senate, Official Report, July 2, 1963, col. 97. 
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significant change. When, during the discussion of the latter motion, KADU 
Senators attacked the Minister for Commerce and Industry for overlooking 
the development of regions other than his own, the Leader of Government 
Business deplored such criticism since, he said, it might become "a precedent 
whereby the Senate will be regarded not as a national house but as a 
Regional Assembly."33 
There was, moreover, strong resistance on the part of a few KANU 
members to allowing the Senate to become a forum for the expression of 
district or tribal interests, although such a role had clearly been intended for 
it by the framers of the Constitution and had been recognized as legitimate 
by Sen. Mathenge. In the course of the debate on the Governor's speech to 
the National Assembly, Sen. M. T. Jilo asserted: 
We, as Senators of this House, are not, and have not been told or author-
ized to speak on behalf of our constituencies, but to say things that repre-
sent the views of the people of the country as a whole . . . . The Leader of the 
Opposition has shown clearly that he himself is a tribalist, and his speech 
yesterday shows that he is not representing the country as a whole. . . . 
His speech was that of a man representing one particular district of the 
country.39 
Similarly, Sen. Lubembe attacked a KADU motion which urged the Govern-
ment tb eliminate wild game outside the Parks so as to reduce the loss of life 
and property particularly in the Masai and Samburu districts, saying that it 
was tribalistic and therefore "outside the jurisdiction of this Senate." He 
added, "When you start talking of tribalism . . . , you become no statesman. 
Therefore you do not qualify to sit in this Senate."10 
The Jilo-Lubembe interpretation did not in fact prevail, however. KADU 
Senators insisted that they were perfectly justified in emphasizing the 
particular grievances and desires of their own constituents since they were 
elected by them and were best acquainted with their problems and needs. 
Accordingly, they introduced ten motions which called upon the Govern-
ment to do something for individual tribes or districts, asked thirty-seven 
questions dealing with purely local matters, and persisted in criticizing the 
Government for neglecting the economic and educational development of 
the more backward tribes and for favoring the Kikuyu and Luo in appoint-
ments to the civil service, the award of scholarships for study abroad, the 
provision of water and electricity, and the location of hospitals, schools, 
roads, factories, and settlement schemes. A strong concern for their own 
districts was also displayed by several KANU Senators, particularly those 
from the smaller tribes. Their attitude was illustrated by Sen. J. H. Robaro 
when he asserted, "I who represent the Turkana must speak for them and 
1,8 Ibid., November 2 1 , 1963, col. 994. 
3® Ibid., June 20, 1963, col. 37. 
t0Ibid., August 6, 1963, col. 727. 
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tell the Government all about them and their difficulties."41 There were 
sixty-nine questions and five motions from the Government benches reflect-
ing the interests of particular localities. When one of these motions was 
attacked as "tribalistic and selfish," Sen. S. F. Mbeo (KANU) asked for a 
ruling from the chair as to whether it was wrong for a Senator to introduce 
a motion dealing with his own district. The Deputy Speaker replied that 
"the Government would not have allowed this Motion to be brought in this 
House if it was wrong."42 KANU Senators also voiced criticism of Govern-
ment discrimination against certain tribes, and their right to do this was 
also upheld by the chair. When Sen. Lubembe asked the Deputy Speaker 
whether it was in order for Sen. J. M. Nthula (KANU) to complain that the 
Wakamba had only one Minister in the Cabinet, he replied, "Why was he 
elected if he cannot represent his tribe?"43 
KANU Senators displayed considerable independence of the party leader-
ship in asking questions as well as in introducing and speaking on motions. 
One hundred and thirty-six of the questions came from them. Seventeen 
of the motions which originated in the Senate were introduced by KANU 
members and most of these were evidently not cleared with the Leader of 
Government Business previously, for he or another Front Bencher proposed 
amendments to eleven of them and opposed three others altogether. Several 
KANU Senators spoke in support of these motions before the wishes of the 
Government were made known, and a few were openly reluctant to change 
their position thereafter. Moreover, seventeen of the KADU motions drew 
favorable comments from across the aisle. A few KANU Senators were quite 
outspoken in asserting their independence. Sen. Lubembe, for example, 
announced that he would support the Opposition motion calling for imme-
diate Africanization of the staff of the Parliament Buildings "even if the 
Government bring up all sorts of amendments, and even if the Leader of 
Government Business says I must not support it."4' Sen. Kebaso endorsed 
the motion urging the Government to reconsider its restrictions on coffee 
planting with the comment, "We are not here merely to voice the opinion 
of Government, we are free thinkers and should express our thoughts."45 
The Government responded to thirty-six of the forty-one motions which 
it did not initiate by either calling for their rejection or proposing amend-
ments which would render them acceptable, and when the votes were taken 
party lines actually held well enough for its wishes to prevail in all but four 
cases. The Leader of Government Business was defeated on a division only 
once; his amendment to a motion which urged that the Government make 
loans to County Councils for the improvement of housing for primary school 
"Ibid., August i i , 1964, p. I 2 (typescript). 
42 Ibid., September 19, 1963, cols. 848-849. 
"Ibid., March 12, 1964, col. 276. 
44 Ibid., July 25, 1963, col. 504. 
45 Ibid., November 27, 1963, col. 1093. 
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teachers was negatived on March 12, 1964 by a vote of 15 to 11. Seven 
KANU Senators defied the Whip, all but one of whoi~ were themselves 
former schoolteachers. 
The effectiveness of the Senate's effort to influence the behavior of the 
Executive was severely limited by the fact that there was no Minister and 
only one Parliamentary Secretary among its members. The failure to name 
a Senator to the Cabinet was thought by some to be part of a calculated 
attempt by the Government to reduce the significance of the second cham-
ber, while others felt that it resulted simply from the fact that there was no 
one of Ministerial caliber in that body. Whatever the explanation might be 
the effect was clear enough: the Senate was denied the benefit of direct, 
regular communication with the Cabinet and of fully authoritative explana-
tions of Government policy. 
One Senator was designated as Leader of Government Business and ten 
others were given responsibility for answering on behalf of particular Minis-
tries during the debates and question periods. These ten were clearly not in 
close touch with their respective Ministries, however, and liaison between 
the Senate and the Government was conducted almost entirely by the 
Leader of Government Business. 
These arrangements were sharply criticized by the Opposition. Mr. R. S. 
Alexander, a KADU member of the House of Representatives, called atten-
tion to contradictory statements in the two chambers regarding Government 
policy on nationalization of the radio and press, and held that this was 
merely an illustration of the difficulty which was bound to arise unless at 
least one Minister could be drawn from the upper house. Such an appoint-
ment was necessary, he said, "for the smooth working, the efficient working 
of the Senate."46 Sen. Munoko (KADU) charged that the Senators on the 
Front Bench could not "get the inside of the workings of the Ministries" and 
the Senate could therefore not "carry out the Government Business in a 
respectable manner."47 
In an effort to improve the situation, a provision was added to the Con-
stitution at the London conference of September-October 1963 which 
authorized Ministers to attend all meetings of the house of which they 
were not a member and to take part in its deliberations but not to vote. 
Thereafter, Senators repeatedly asked that various Ministers be invited 
to appear before them to reply to certain questions and motions, but the 
only cabinet members who actually attended the Senate during the period 
under examination were the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 
the Minister for Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, and the Minister 
for Education. The first of these was present at the two meetings devoted 
to the declaration of an Emergency in the North-Eastern Region and urged 
46 Kenya House of Representatives, Official Report, July 2, 1963, col. 495. 
" K e n y a Senate, Official Report, July 9, 1963, col. 291. 
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in the strongest possible terms that the Senate act favorably. He appeared 
again two months later when the extension of the Emergency was con-
sidered, but did not speak in support of the motion then as there was clearly 
no danger of its being defeated. He also participated in the debate on the 
Immigration and Deportation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill at the same 
meeting, stressing the necessity for immediate approval by the Senate. The 
visit of the Minister for Information coincided with the introduction of the 
Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (Nationalization) Bill on June 25, 1964; 
he departed as soon as consent was secured to waiving the Standing Orders 
so that its passage could be accelerated. Only the Minister for Education 
came to answer parliamentary questions, attending briefly the meeting of 
September 29, 1964. Such limited appearances were quite in keeping with 
the wishes of the Leader of Government Business; he told the Senate that he 
had not wanted Ministers to come "all the time" for "it would detract from 
the dignity of this House."48 Others were not satisfied, however. Particularly 
distressing was the failure of the Prime Minister to visit the upper house; 
it seemed to indicate, complained the Chief Government Whip, that the 
Senate was "not recognized."45 
The Leader of Government Business himself clearly thought that the 
problem of liaison demanded some other solution. When he was asked why 
he had not been appointed a Minister, he declined to offer an explanation 
but confessed his belief that "it should have been done" and invited the 
questioner. Sen. Munoko (KADU), to table a motion on the matter so that 
the Senate could make its wishes known.50 Sen. Munoko's motion, which 
called upon the Government to make the Leader of Government Business 
a Minister without Portfolio and to pay a salary of £400 to each of the 
Senators on the Front Bench, was ruled inadmissable by the Speaker on 
July 3, however, because of the constitutional restrictions on the Senate 
with regard to financial measures. Later that month the Leader of Govern-
ment Business was sharply criticized by the Speaker for his tardiness in 
supplying answers to parliamentary questions. He replied that he was 
hampered by the fact that he lacked executive authority and had received 
very little cooperation from the Ministries. When the Government spokes-
man failed again the following day to have an answer ready at the question 
period and cited in defense the lack of Parliamentary Secretaries in the 
Senate, the Speaker commented that something was "very seriously lacking 
in Government organization here," and added that if such occurrences 
continued he did not see how the Senate could proceed with its business or, 
indeed, how its existence could be justified.51 
The significance of the Senate's critical function was further reduced by 
,e Ibid., July 1, 1964, galley proof H (Sen. J . P. Mathenge). 
43 Ibid., June 30, 1964, col. 177 (page proof) (Sen. D. O. Makasembo). 
50 Ibid., July 1 , 1964, galley proof H. 
51Ibid., July 3 1 , 1964, galley proof E. 
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the lack of any assurance that its resolutions would be implemented, for 
that body had no means of enforcing its will. Senators of both parties 
repeatedly protested at the Government's failure to earn out their motions 
and even questioned the utility of continuing to pass them. The Government 
reply typically was that the proposals could not be put into effect until the 
necessary money became available. Action on the motions passed over the 
Government's objections seemed altogether unlikely. Sen. Mathenge made 
it clear that compliance with the one regarding teachers' housing could 
not be expected. That motion, he asserted, "means nothing as it is un-
constitutional," since primary schools were under the jurisdiction of the 
regions.52 Moreover, he told the press after the Senate had passed a resolution 
urging the appointment of a committee to recommend ways of combatting 
tribalism that the Government rejected the motion and considered it 
"unfortunate" that it had even been considered.53 
The Senators were in a position to control the Government effectively 
in one respect, however—the use of emergency powers—and an opportunity 
to exercise this control arose at the end of 1963. On December 25, when 
both houses were adjourned, the Government proclaimed a State of Emer-
gency in the North-Eastem Region to strengthen its hand in coping with the 
"shifta" raids in that area by those who favored its transfer to the Somali 
Republic. According to the Constitution, the Emergency would lapse unless 
approved by 65 per cent of each house within seven days. 
KADU was unwilling to support the proclamation primarily because the 
Leader of the Opposition had not been consulted before it was issued. 
Members of that party also argued that there was no need for an Emergency 
since the Government had not exhausted the powers already available to it. 
The necessary majority was easily obtained in the House of Representatives, 
but the danger of defeat for the Government was very great in the Senate 
since KADU held 39 per cent of the seats there. 
The Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Mr. Mboya, sought 
to persuade the Opposition Senators in a dramatic speech to the upper house 
on the morning of December 31, 1963. He indicated that the Government 
would continue the Emergency regardless of what the Senate might do, 
even if this involved violating the Constitution, saying : 
Let nobody be deceived that if this Motion is not passed there will be no 
State of Emergency; there will still be a State of Emergency. Then you will 
have no one to blame but yourselves. The world will know that the 
people who first made it impossible for the Kenya Constitution to work 
were the Opposition and not the Government. . . . 
My own view is that it is wrong to be forced to live outside the Con-
stitution, . . . but I also know that as a Government we have a responsi-
52 Ibid., March 12, 1964, col. 265. 
53 Daily Nation, March 20, 1964. 
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bility . . . to safeguard human lives, property and the integrity of this 
country's boundaries, and that responsibility is supreme. . . . this Govern-
ment must act and, I hope, Mr. Speaker, with the full support of the 
Senate. . . .M 
The Opposition was not intimidated by this threat, however; all fourteen 
KADU Senators present voted against the proclamation. Every Senator on 
the Government side supported it, but their twenty-three votes produced 
an insufficient majority of only 60.5 per cent. 
In a final effort to avert a serious constitutional crisis, Mr. Mboya and 
Mr. Joseph Murumbi, Minister of State, hastily arranged a meeting with 
Mr. Ngala and Mr. D. T. Moi, the chairman of KADU. Agreement was reached 
among them that the Senate should be called together again that afternoon 
so that the motion could be re-opened for another vote. The statement issued 
by these four affirmed that the Prime Minister had intended to contact Mr. 
Ngala before the debate on the Emergency but had been unable to do so. 
At the afternoon session of the Senate, the Leader of the Opposition rose 
to support the Government motion rescinding the previous decision, but 
deplored the threat which had been made. His deputy also supported the 
motion, but asked the Government to "realize that the Senate has a part 
to play in the running of this country" and to honor the Constitution. The 
Leader of Government Business welcomed the change in the Opposition's 
position "at a critical m o m e n t . . . when the fabric of the Constitution could 
have been broken," and congratulated the Senate for having "proved its 
maturity as a guardian of the Constitution and of the rights of the people 
of Kenya."55 The motion was thereupon passed. 
V 
A further function which might be expected of a second chamber would 
be for it to make a contribution towards the education of public opinion. 
The Kenya Senate cannot be judged a great success in this respect, however, j 
for its debates reached a very small number of people and were accorded 
but slight respect. 
There was little interest in observing the Senators' deliberations. The 
gallery overlooking the hall in which they met was quite small and almost 1 
never well filled. The House of Representatives, in contrast, generally 
attracted a sizeable audience, due largely to the fact that the better known 
politicians were to be seen in action there. 
Moreover, the press and radio reported the proceedings of the Senate with 
much less prominence and detail than those of the lower house, and some-
times ignored Senate meetings altogether. Senators repeatedly complained 
of this neglect and called for more equal coverage. Some charged that the 
lack of publicity was part of the Government effort to undermine bi-
54 Kenya Senate, Official Report, Dec. 3 1 , 1963, cols. 32, 34. 
55 Ibid., cols. 50-51 (Sen. N. W . Munoko, Sen. J. P. Mathenge). 
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c a m e r a l i s m ; the failure to inform the people of what the Senate was doing 
was creating a situation, they feared, in which the electorate would be 
unwilling to support its expenses. Others accepted the less sinister explana-
tion that what went on in the Senate was simply recognized by the mass 
media to be less important. 
The voice of the Senate was further muted by the delay in publishing its 
Hansard. The official reports for the first year were made available to the 
public only in the form of three large and expensive volumes, and there was 
an interval of approximately five months between the last debate in each 
volume and the date of its publication. In contrast, daily Hansards were 
issued for the House of Representatives within about a fortnight of each 
meeting. Sen. Munoko (KADU) warned that the Senate was being made to 
appear "non-existent" and introduced a motion urging that its reports be 
published more promptly.56 He was informed by the Leader of Government 
Business, however, that the Government Printer was too busy to produce 
daily issues and that there was no money available to pay for having them 
done elsewhere. 
The educational effect of the Senate was also limited by the fact that the 
standard of its debates was not of a very high order. It was a rather 
boisterous and unruly house. Those speaking were frequently interrupted 
by shouts and fraudulent points of order which made it quite difficult for 
them to develop their arguments thoughtfully and for the debate to proceed 
systematically. The presiding officer cautioned Senators repeatedly to comply 
with the rules of order and warned them against undignified behaviour which 
would bring the House into disrepute. On one occasion he expelled an 
intoxicated member for fourteen sitting days. There were many irrelevancies 
and much repetition in Senators' speeches, and their language was often 
quite emotional and intemperate. It was also often evident that members 
had not done their "homework." 
The quality of the Senate's deliberations was such, indeed, that the Leader 
of Government Business was prompted to warn its members that their 
conduct was weakening the case for retaining bicameralism. He said: 
. . . I take this opportunity to appeal to hon. Members to try and behave 
with the dignity that is required of this House as the Senate. This is the 
Senior House, and it is supposed to consist of the elder statesmen. But at 
the moment there is a tendency for many people—and I have had this 
from other Members of the House of Representatives, who have made 
derogatory remarks on our procedure—to realize that a higher standard 
of debate and more serious contributions to the Government of the 
country, will make this House a considered one, and the more right we 
will have to remain if we are going to remain.57 
561bid., July 9, 1963, col. 289. 
57 Ibid., September 24, 1963, col. 901 (Sen. J. P. Mathenge). 
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VI 
The Senate had little chance to exercise its formal constituent powers 
during the period under examination, for only one measure came before it 
which involved a constitutional question and therefore required resort to 
the amending process. This was the Compensation and Retiring Benefits 
(Amendment) Bill, which sought to exclude locally recruited officers from 
the provision of the Order in Council promulgated by the United Kingdom 
on December n , 1963, dealing with pensions for civil servants who might 
be compulsorily retired in the interest of Africanization. The Constitution 
stated that benefits could not be reduced below what was provided by the 
laws in force at the time of independence, and the Speaker therefore ruled 
that a 75 per cent majority would be required for the passage of this bill. 
That was quickly and easily obtained on March 11, 1964; no objections were 
raised in the debate and no negative votes were recorded in the division. 
There was, however, ample opportunity for the Senate to play its role as 
guardian of the Constitution in a larger sense as it discussed altering the 
distribution of powers between the center and the regions. Here too party 
considerations proved decisive. KADU members alone defended regionalism; 
they urged the Government to transfer powers and funds to the regions as 
required by the Constitution, argued that the system was working well, and 
warned against any attempt to scrap it. KANU Senators were uniformly 
critical of regionalism; they charged that it caused a waste of money and 
time, and complicated the problems of economic development, nation-
building, and maintaining law and order. They not only made it clear that 
they favored a marked reduction in the powers of the regions but also took 
the position that it was altogether inappropriate for that system to be 
defended by anyone in the Senate. The Leader of Government Business 
affirmed, "In my view this question of Majimbo [regionalism] is just some-
thing which does not deserve any mention in a very respected House like 
this. . . "58 
As it began to appear that the new Government was determined to secure 
modifications in the Constitution, a KADU Senator introduced a motion 
affirming adherence to the existing arrangements and urging the Government 
to discipline its members "who of late have been making irresponsible 
statements about changing the Constitution."59 KANU Senators refused to 
support it, however. In fact, the Chief Government Whip said: 
The mandate has been given . . . to change the Constitution overnight. . . . 
It is not up to us to say that we should not change the Constitution. This 
is a Motion which cannot be accepted by the Government. . . . It cannot 
be before this House. . . . if Kenyatta accepts that the Constitution will 
stay then it will stay, if not it must go, it will go because he is the man 
58 Ibid., July 3, 1963, col. 15 1 (Sen. C. K. Lubembe). 
59 Ibid., August 1, 1963, col. 662 (Sen. G. N. Kalya). 
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who has the mandate of the people. . . .M 
When the conference to revise the Constitution got under way in London 
later that year, all the KANU Senators sent a cable to Mr. Kenyatta support-
ing his demands although these included a substantial reduction in the 
ability of the Senate to prevent constitutional changes. 
The terms of The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill which was 
published on October 21, 1964, were no doubt affected "prenatally" by the 
fact that the Senate still possessed considerable power over amendments. 
Changes in the entrenched clauses had to be carefully avoided for KANU 
knew that it could not mobilize the 90 per cent majority in the upper 
chamber required to make them effective. A drastic reduction in the 
authority of the regions was proposed, however, for a negative vote by all 
the KADU Senators on those changes could do no more than force a 
referendum which KANU was confident of winning. 
VII 
The Senate certainly did not play a larger role in the Kenyan political 
system during the sixteen months of its initial trial period than had been 
provided for it in the Constitution. There was no expansion of its authority 
and no increase in its functions either by usage or formal amendment. 
In fact, the new second chamber had not even exercised its assigned 
powers in such a way as to realize fully the purposes intended by those who 
urged its creation. 
The Senate clearly did not operate as a bulwark of regionalism, although 
its failure in this respect could readily have been anticipated and must be 
attributed primarily to the decisions at the two London conferences regard-
ing its structure and powers. 
Its performance as an instrument for protecting minority rights and local 
interests was more impressive, but left a good deal to be desired. At least 
it served as a forum in which tribal anxieties were freely ventilated and the 
needs of localities publicly articulated. Actually, however, the protests and 
demands of Senators speaking for the smaller tribes were no more effective 
than were those of their Representatives in the lower house. In both 
chambers, the minority tribes could be heard, but in neither could they 
determine the action on bills or motions. Although their strength was 
relatively greater in the Senate, party affiliation generally proved decisive 
when voting took place and the KANU majority almost invariably prevailed. 
The two major revolts against the party leadership were due more to 
loyalty to an occupational grouping (the motion on teachers' housing) or 
sensitivity to public opinion generally (the bill to increase pensions) than 
to specific constituency pressures. 
When one looks back over the Senate's record, the conclusion can hardly 
be resisted that its survival was due less to the accomplishment of any 
60 Ibid., cols. 672-673, 675 (Sen. D. O. Makasembo). 
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positive good than to the fact that it did no great harm. Its contribution to 
the making of laws was of very slight value, but it did not delay or tamper 
with bills so as to create problems for the Government. Its influence on the 
exercise of executive power was insignificant, but it did not harass the 
Ministers unduly with motions and questions. Its impact on public opinion 
was negligible, but it did not emerge as a rival of the House of Representa-
tives in the eyes of the people. Its guardianship of the Constitution was 
irresolute; it did not interfere materially with the KANU effort to strip the 
regions of their powers. 
The inconveniences which the Senate caused from time to time were not 
serious enough to justify the trouble which would have been involved in 
abolishing it. To eliminate it constitutionally would have been practically 
impossible because 90 per cent of the Senators would have had to agree and 
there were strong indications that members on both sides of the aisle would 
resist. To abolish it unconstitutionally would have been politically unwise 
at a time when approval was being sought for amendments which would 
reduce the powers of the regions and strengthen the position of the Execu-
tive, and when the transition to a one-party state was being arranged. The 
retention of an institution which was regarded as the child of KADU and 
which was so constructed as to favor the smaller tribes would increase the 
respectability of the new regime, assist in refuting charges of authori-
tarianism, and possibly contribute to the growth of unity and stability in 
Kenya. 
The Senate's survival may also have been due to the fact that it provided 
an additional platform from which the Government could defend itself, and 
to the hope that its members might be of value in mobilizing support for 
Government programs. That such a service might be expected of Senators 
was indicated by the Leader of Government Business when he replied to an 
Opposition motion which asked for an improvement in the supply of water 
to certain coastal areas. He stated that the mover could "be of great assis-
tance . . . to the Government . . . if he would hold meetings with his own 
people, explain Government policy to them and enlist their cooperation 
with Government officers."61 
There is a real possibility that the Senate will play a more prominent and 
constructive role in the months ahead. Having decided to retain it for at 
least a while longer, the Government may undertake to make it somewhat 
more useful and thereby, perhaps unintentionally, strengthen its impor-
tance. The Senators themselves may now feel less inhibited by the danger 
of abolition and more inclined to assert their prerogatives. This tendency 
may be increased by a growing sense of corporate identity. In addition, as 
the Senators acquire more experience, they can be expected to function 
more effectively. The position of the upper house may also be improved by 
61 Ibid., September 3, 1964, pp. J 1-2 (typescript) (Sen. J . P. Mathenge). 
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the new constitutional changes, for they have freed it of the incubus of 
regionalism; its identification with that system was a factor which dis-
credited bicameralism in the eyes of many. Moreover, bills may be more 
sharply scrutinized and local interests may find more effective expression 
under the recently established one-party system, for the elimination of a 
formal Opposition is said to reduce the need for such strict party discipline. 
There is, at any rate, greater need for a vital second chamber now, for it is 
desirable to have as many channels of communication and as many oppor-
tunities for re-examination and criticism as possible in the absence of an 
opposing party. 
On the other hand, it must not be concluded that the future of the Senate 
is now completely assured. If the single party can be tightly controlled, the 
second chamber can be liquidated by amendment of the Constitution. If not, 
the possibility of its abolition unconstitutionally is not altogether inconceiv-
able. Although given a new lease on life, it remains on probation. Whether 
Kenya can afford to maintain an institution which actually contributes no 
more than has the Senate may well become increasingly doubtful. If, how-
ever, in attempting to accomplish more, it seems to be obstructing the 
Government, it may well be swept quickly away. The challenge facing the 
Senate of Kenya at present is to discover ways of participating in the govern-
ing process that will justify but not jeopardize its existence. 
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